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Summary
This testimony describes the results of a study of the
Employment Service (ES) conducted by Dr. Jacobson and Prof. Arnold
Katz of the University of Pittsburgh using data on over 100,000
individuals who registered with the Pennsylvania ES between 1978
and 1987, and an even larger sample of non-registrants.

One major finding is that much of the decline in the ES's
performance over the past thirty years can be explained by
changes in: funding, characteristics of registrants, and
characteristics of job vacancies. Thus, we concluded that
criticism of the ES often ignores changes in crucial factors
outside of the ES's control that reduced its effectiveness.
A second major finding is that most criticism of the ES is
based on the inappropriate assumption that the primary goal of
the ES should be to maximize placements. The proper measure of
ES benefits is how well it reduces joblessness, increases
earnings, and reduces UI and welfare payments.
We found that the ES reduced the average duration of
unemployment of long-term UI claimants by nine weeks. This was
for UI claimants who were unemployed for at least 30 weeks. But
the ES reduced joblessness of claimants unemployed for 12 weeks
by less than two weeks.

This is evidence that the ES is most effective in aiding
claimants who had substantial trouble finding work on their own.
But we suspect that the jobs found with the help of the ES do not
compare favorably with jobs held prior to becoming unemployed.
Thus, we believe the ES primarily acts as a backstop preventing
large earnings losses.
Finally, although savings in UI benefits and increases in
earnings created by the ES may be modest, the cost of ES service
is so low, $75 on average, that modest benefits would more than
offset those costs.
We believe our results, coupled with similar findings from
related studies, is sufficiently strong to warrant increasing the
funding of the ES. That measure is favored because it would be
at least budget neutral. In contrast, other measures to assist
the long-term unemployed, such as providing extended UI benefits
or training, would not come close to being budget neutral. In
addition, $1 spent on job search assistance is likely to be more
effective in helping claimants than $1 spent on training.
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I am honored to have this opportunity to discuss my research
on the Employment Service (ES) with you today. And am equally
pleased that the committee is interested in a broad assessment of
the ability of job search assistance to aid unemployment insurance
claimants.
The research that Arnold Katz of the University of Pittsburgh
and I conducted used administrative data routinely produced by
the Pennsylvania UI and ES systems to examine the effectiveness
of the ES in Pennsylvania. We assembled detailed histories of
the work, unemployment, and ES usage of over 100,000 individuals
who registered with the ES between 1978 and 1987, and compared
their histories to those of an even larger sample of nonregistrants .
We chose Pennsylvania for several reasons. First, it is one
of only two states with data covering a full business cycle.
Second, it has an unusual, diverse economy. The western third
resembles the rust-belt of the industrial heartland, while the
eastern section resembles prosperous areas along the North
Atlantic seaboard. But most important, it is the only state
where use of the ES is voluntary for UI claimants. This key fact
provides unique information about the optimal timing of ES usage.
Importantly, our results are consistent with Terry Johnson's
1981 study which examined the ES in 29 states, and the results of
demonstration projects in a number of states including Texas,
South Carolina, Washington, and New Jersey, which examined the
effectiveness of programs providing job search assistance to UI
claimants.
Recently, we have heard a great deal about the fog of war.
I have found, however, that a fog of misunderstanding surrounds
many public policy issues, including how well the ES fulfills its
mission. What was clear when we began our study was that the ES
is unpopular "inside the beltway". For example, last year
Secretary of Labor Dole expressed concern about the effectiveness
of the ES in a letter to state administrators. She cited, among
other criticisms, "declines in the percent of all hires placed by
the ES from 20 percent in 1962 to 7 percent today". But what was
lost in a thick haze was whether or not the criticism leveled at
the ES was valid.
One major element of our study assessed the accuracy of the
widespread negative views by placing ES performance into an
appropriate context. We found much of the decline in performance
can be explained by changes in: funding, characteristics of
registrants, and characteristics of job vacancies.
Perhaps roost important, we found that ES funding levels fell
dramatically. These cuts were particularly sharp in the early
1980's. Between 1979 and 1986 Pennsylvania registrations
increased by 15 percent, but total funding, in inflation adjusted
dollars, decreased by 10 percent.
We also found that 25 percent of ES registrations were
mandatory under the WIN program. WIN is a program for AFDC

recipients with school-age children, a program that began five
years after 1962. As you might guess, WIN participants are about
twice as difficult to place as other registrants.

In addition, we found that the ES is most effective in
placing low-skilled workers. The fraction of jobs held by
workers with high-school education or less has declined
substantially since 1962.
In short, we concluded that criticism of the ES often
ignored changes in crucial factors outside of the ES's control
that reduced its effectiveness. Ignoring those factors is much
like George Steinbrenner placing all the blame for the decline of
the New York Yankees on his managers.
But of even greater importance, we found that the criteria
used to judge the ES were inappropriate. Most criticism is based
on the assumption that the primary goal of the ES should be to
maximize the number of placements. The proper measure of ES
effectiveness, however, is how well it reduces joblessness,
increases earnings, and reduces UI and welfare payments.
The second major element of our study examined how well the
ES gets UI claimants with over three years of work experience
back to work. Unadjusted figures showed that UI claimants who
used the ES took considerably longer to find work than non-users.
Those results reflect the fact that the most effective means of
finding work are through tips from friends and relatives, direct
applications at work sites, answering want ads, and using private
agencies. Such comparisons tell us little about the ES's
effectiveness, however, because jobless workers typically turn to
the ES only after use of other methods have failed.
Key evidence that ES use is triggered by the failure to find
work by other means is that more than half of the claimants who
used the ES delayed use until all, or almost all, of their UI
benefits were exhausted. In contrast, two-thirds of the nonusers returned to work before coming close to exhausting benefits.
To control for factors which influence the return to work,
including access to various job'search methods, we used an
estimating technique that compared ES-users to non-users with
similar demographic and work history characteristics. Most
important, we determined the delay in ES use how long the users
were unemployed at the point they first looked for a job at the
ES. We then compared the subsequent duration of unemployment of
the users to non-users whose prior spells of unemployment were
equal to that of the users. For example, UI claimants who
registered with the ES in their thirtieth week of unemployment
were compared to otherwise similar UI claimants who also were
unemployed for 29 weeks, but did not register with the ES in the
thirtieth week.
That comparison showed that UI claimants who delayed use of
the ES by roughly 30 weeks returned to work 9 weeks sooner than
they would have had they not used the ES. In contrast, we found
that UI claimants who delayed ES-use for roughly 12 weeks had at
most a two-week reduction in unemployment.
The shift from a 2 to 9 week reduction in unemployment as
the delay in ES-use lengthened suggests that the ES is particularly
effective in aiding a relatively small segment of claimants who
have trouble finding work on their own.
Additional evidence bearing on ES effectiveness is the
percentage of claimants who use the ES. If the ES provides a
valuable service, we would expect a high percentage of claimants
to use it. About 55 percent of the claimants exhausting UI
benefits used the ES, compared to only 13 percent of those who
did not exhaust benefits. This reinforces the view that the ES

is most effective in dealing with those having trouble finding
work.
A potential problem with the analysis I have just discussed
is that use of the ES may not have caused all the reduction in
joblessness. Instead, some claimants may have begun to use the
ES and other job finding methods intensively as they came close
to exhausting benefits, but use of the other methods may have
contributed to the speedier reemployment.
To rule out this possibility we examined how the quality of
the services provided by the ES influenced the duration of
joblessness. All the ES-users in our sample searched the ES's
lists of job openings to find work. Half of the users could not
find a job opening to which they wanted to be referred. Onethird of the users were referred to jobs, but that referral did
not lead to being hired. One-sixth of ES-users were placed at
the jobs to which the ES referred them.
If the ES caused the reduction in joblessness, we would
expect the reduction in joblessness would be large for those
placed, moderate for those referred but not places, and small for
those who could not even find an opening worth pursuing.
Our analysis was much in keeping with these expectations.
Among claimants who delayed use of the ES by about 30 weeks, the
duration of unemployment was reduced by 18 weeks among those
placed by the ES, 12 weeks among those referred but not placed,
and 2 weeks among those who could not find a job listing to which
they were willing to apply.
This is powerful evidence that the ES was responsible for
the reductions in unemployment. But you may still be skeptical
that the ES contributed to reducing the joblessness of users who
were not directly placed. A plausible explanation for the
positive effects is that the ES provided information which led to
the adoption of more realistic expectations about job vacancies.
For example, after seeing that the ES had no listings of interest,
some claimants quickly took jobs they knew were available, but
had been hesitant to accept because they thought they could do
better.
To summarize the key findings about ES effectiveness, we
believe that the ES reduced the average duration of joblessness
by about 9 weeks for more than half of UI claimants who were
unemployed for 30 weeks, and therefore, clearly had substantial
trouble finding work using other job search methods.
Further, our evidence that most ES users accept jobs after
exhausting UI benefits suggests that jobs obtained through the ES
are much preferable to remaining jobless, but do not compare
favorably with jobs held prior to becoming unemployed. Thus, we
believe the ES primarily acts as a backstop preventing large
earnings losses.
A final issue of great importance is assessing how the
benefits of ES use compare to the costs. We are still working on
that part of our analysis. Thus, we can not provide figures on
the savings in UI payments and gains in earnings, but we suspect
those benefits are modest. On the other hand, only modest
benefits are needed to offset ES costs.
On average the ES spends only $75 per registrant, and the
average weekly UI benefit payment for claimants using the ES was
$170. Thus, a reduction in 2 days of UI compensation per ES-user
would nearly offset the cost of the ES services.
Alternatively, if we conservatively assume 15 percent of
earnings are paid in federal taxes, the ES would have to increase
annual earnings by only $500 on average to pay for the ES

services. If the pay of post-unemployment jobs held by the users
was half the pay of their pre-unemployment jobs, average weekly
earnings would be $200. Thus, a modest increase in employment of
two and a half weeks would be sufficient to pay for the cost of
ES services.
The bottom line question facing the committee is whether
these results are sufficiently strong to act upon, and if so what
actions should be taken.
My view is that these results are strong the sample is
unusually large, the data are accurate, the analysis uses the
best available estimation techniques, and Pennsylvania is a
sufficiently diverse state to suggest the results would hold
elsewhere. Moreover, the results are consistent with those from
the only other similar analysis of the ES. And studies examining
the value of providing job search assistance to UI claimants also
generally show positive results.
A major factor favoring increasing ES funding is that there
is a strong chance that such expenditures would return more than
their costs to the Federal treasury in terms of reduced UI
payments and increased taxes. Alternatives to aid the long-term
unemployed, such as extending UI benefits, or increasing training,
would certainly not be budget neutral.
Further, the triad of job search assistance, training, and
transfer payments appears to be out of balance. The US-DOL has
steadily favored training at the expense of job search assistance,
despite consistent evidence that training is no more productive
for the long-term unemployed than job search assistance, but much
more expensive.
Although both JTPA and EDWAA have job search assistance
components, and the ES receives contracts to provide those
services in many states, the ES has been starved for funds. A
testimony to the perceived value of the ES "outside the beltway"
is that states have used their own funds to partially offset
Federal cuts. Despite state actions, Federal cuts led to the
virtual elimination of promising counseling and job development
efforts, as well as delays in purchasing cost-saving automation
systems.
The DOL's negative attitude towards the ES is difficult to
understand, given that through the ES the DOL runs the only public
institution providing job search assistance for all workers. It
would make much more sense for the DOL to down grade training
since public schools, community and four-year colleges, and many
other public institutions provide vocational training.
In short, given the strong, consistent evidence that the ES
is effective in aiding the unemployed, the DOL's attempts to cut
the ES budget makes about as much sense as the U.S. Navy
recommending giving a large fraction of the money spent on
nuclear submarines to the Air Force to maintain the other two
components of the nuclear triad manned bombers and land-based
missiles.
I hope this testimony has dispelled some of the fog
surrounding the ability of the ES to fulfill its mission. I very
deeply appreciate having this opportunity to discuss with you the
research that Arnold Katz' and I have done.

Appendix A.

The Organization, Funding, and Mission of the ES.

The Employment Service and Unemployment Insurance System
were created in 1933 by the Wagner-Peyser Act. Both are federally
mandated programs that leave to the states vide discretion in
organizing both agencies. Technically the UI and ES are separate
entities. However, states usually have a single State Employment
Security Agency, cross-train personnel, and locate offices in the
same buildings.
The UI and ES also share the same funding source the FUTA
payroll tax. UI and ES administrative costs are formula funded
out of a small fraction of the total tax. About $800,000,000 of
that tax is spent on the ES.
The primary mission of the ES is to provide a public labor
exchange where all employers can list openings and all job
seekers can come to find suitable matches. In practice the ES
tends to occupy the niche of providing services to workers with
problems finding work, and best serves employers hiring those
workers.
The original focus was helping workers unemployed during the
Great Depression. During World War II the ES funneled workers to
defense industries, and at the end of the war assisted veterans
to find civilian jobs. The ES's special mission with vets has
persisted. Today about 15 percent of the ES staff is dedicated
to aiding veterans and paid from a separate federal fund.
The ES has also been given special responsibility to assist
welfare recipients, other economically disadvantaged persons, and
the long-term unemployed. The ES sometimes receives contracts to
place JTPA, EDWAA, and JOBS participants, but the ES receives no
special funding for assisting most economically disadvantaged
persons.
Usually UI claimants must register with the ES. But the ES
offers both a carrot and a stick for such registrants. If the ES
finds a suitable job opening for a UI claimant, that person is
obliged to attend an interview. Failure to do so is reported to
the UI system and can lead to a particularly severe penalty loss
of benefit entitlement until the claimant returns to work for
four to six weeks.
The ES also provides labor market information. The collection
of basic information about employment and earnings has been
organized and separately funded as cooperative program between
the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the US-DOL and the state ES's.
Finally, the ES provides counseling and testing. It
sometimes does job development seeking vacancies that fit the
skills of registrants. ES funding cuts during the 1980's,
however, reduced these activities almost to the vanishing point.
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